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ABSTRACT
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 gave the SEC new authority to pursue
monetary penalties through its in-house administrative court system, rather
than in federal court. Since then, the Commission has won the overwhelm-
ing majority of these administrative proceedings, over which one of five
SEC-appointed judges preside, including 219 successive favorable deci-
sions from October 2013 to January 2015. Doubling down, the Commis-
sion has begun bringing more complaints in its administrative court than
ever before, fully leveraging the procedural advantages the in-house system
has over federal court, including no right to trial by jury, looser evidentiary
standards, and a dramatically shortened discovery period.
This Article argues that the Commission’s lack of regulating guidelines
for its administrative proceedings deprives litigants of due process. Addi-
tionally, this Article shows that a strict reading of Supreme Court precedent
dictates that executive control over the Commission’s administrative law
judges is too attenuated under the Appointments Clause.  To solve this
problem, this Article proposes that Congress or the SEC institute objective
criteria for bringing administrative proceedings and revise the SEC’s Rules
of Practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) employs avariety of legal mechanisms to enforce federal securities law,1 butin the last five years, the SEC has increasingly utilized one particu-
lar mechanism: enforcement proceedings brought within its internal court
1. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empiri-
cal Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 746–49 (2003).
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system, similar to those used by many administrative agencies.2 This sys-
tem differs from the federal court system and favors the Commission in
several significant ways.3 For instance, one of five SEC-appointed admin-
istrative law judges (ALJs), rather than federally appointed Article III
judges, preside over the proceedings.4 Respondents cannot receive trial
by jury.5 The mandated discovery period is greatly expedited in compari-
son to the federally mandated discovery period.6 Additionally, the ALJ
must issue his decision within 300 days of the proceeding’s start, even in
the most complex securities law cases.7
Respondents have felt the effects of this increased use in full force. In
fiscal year 2014, the SEC instituted 610 administrative proceedings—
more than twice as many as in 2005, when it instituted 294.8 The SEC’s
most recent, formidable winning streak spans more than 219 administra-
tive decisions from October 2013 to January 2015.9 In September 2014,
the Commission began adding complex insider trading cases to its inter-
nal court system’s docket,10 and administrative proceedings now make up
more than 80% percent of the SEC’s total caseload.11 These statistics,
along with the inherent makeup of the in-house court system, have led
some legal experts to conclude these proceedings suffer from “potential
bias,” harming respondents who might have received a fairer trial in fed-
eral court.12
This Article analyzes the SEC’s recent increased use of administrative
proceedings, constitutional attacks to such use, and proposed procedural
reforms. Because these proceedings deprive respondents of significant
due process and procedural protections in increasingly complex securities
cases, this Article concludes that the SEC is abusing its discretion to try
cases through its internal court system in lieu of federal district courts.
Respondents have recently responded to this abuse by levying constitu-
tional challenges in federal court to the entire SEC in-house court system,
primarily on Due Process and Appointments Clause grounds.13 Many of
the cases are still in district court and several have been dismissed or
2. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Steers More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 21, 2014, at A1.
3. See Peter J. Henning, The S.E.C.’s Use of the ‘Rocket Docket’ is Challenged, N.Y.





7. See Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., A Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at B1.




12. Morgenson, supra note 7.
13. See Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Faces Challenges Over the Constitutionality of Some
of its Court Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 27, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes
.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faces-challenges-over-the-constitutionality-of-some-of-its-court-pro-
ceedings/.
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settled.14 But given the amount of respondents persistently filing such
challenges and the implications of these arguments for other administra-
tive agencies, the circuit courts—and perhaps, eventually, the Supreme
Court—will probably review these cases in the near future. These courts
should ignore the instinct to protect the administrative status quo and
rule in favor of the administrative respondents’ constitutional challenges.
But even if these constitutional attacks are successful, many of the un-
derlying procedural problems with this administrative court system will
likely remain. Only the SEC commissioners or Congress can resolve these
problems, instituting guidelines for bringing administrative proceedings
and installing procedural protections more similar to those afforded in
federal court. The SEC-appointed judges would remain, of course, but
the protections would appropriately reflect the increasingly complex na-
ture of the cases that the Commission brings in-house.
Part II of this Article explores the history of the SEC’s administrative
proceedings as an enforcement mechanism and explains how several re-
forms over the last three decades have granted the Commission a greater
“home court advantage.” Part III discusses how the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 prompted the SEC’s increased use of these proceedings, especially
in complex-litigation cases against entities that the SEC does not directly
regulate. Part IV discusses how this increased use has unfairly affected
administrative respondents and analyzes the merits of constitutional at-
tacks that these respondents have raised in the district courts. Finally,
Part V proposes procedural reforms to the SEC’s current in-house court
system.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEC ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
Congress created the SEC in 193415 to serve the public.16 The agency’s
purpose, generally, “was to prevent fraud and create full disclosure to
allow investors to make informed decisions.”17 The SEC fulfills this pur-
pose in many different ways, one of which is disciplinary action “per-
formed by the Commission under the various federal securities
statutes.”18 It “consists of five Commissioners, appointed by the Presi-
14. See id.
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). See generally 1 LOUIS LOSS,
JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 57–60
(6th ed. 2011) (providing an overview of the Acts).
16. See S.E.C. v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the
SEC is a “statutory guardian charged with safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the
securities laws”); see also Matthew P. Wynne, Note, Rule 10b-5(b) Enforcement Actions in
Light of Janus: Making the Case for Agency Deference, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2111,
2116–17 (2013).
17. Wynne, supra note 16, at 2116.
18. 25 MARC I. STEINBERG AND RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE FEDERAL
& STATE ENFORCEMENT § 4:1 (last updated Sept. 2014); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (mak-
ing it unlawful to act “in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
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dent, who collectively oversee five separate divisions, including a Division
of Enforcement.”19 With nearly 1,300 employees, the Division of En-
forcement is the SEC’s largest division,20 having grown by nearly 60%
over the past twenty-three years.21 It has three primary objectives: “pro-
tect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate
capital formation.”22
With few exceptions, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement brings securi-
ties enforcement actions either in a district court proceeding or in an ad-
ministrative proceeding,23 over which an administrative law judge
presides.24 The Division of Enforcement “is a party to the action and
must prove its case.”25 After the ALJ renders a decision, it may be ap-
pealed to the five-person Commission.26 The Commission’s decision may
then be “appealed by an aggrieved respondent to an appropriate federal
appellate court.”27 The following subsections explain how the SEC’s pow-
ers within administrative proceedings expanded over the two decades
leading up to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.
A. THE SECURITIES AND ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES AND
PENNY STOCK REFORM ACT OF 1990
During the 1980s, the SEC’s enforcement actions began to “shift from
remedial to punitive in nature,” and through the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 198428 and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforce-
ment Act of 1988,29 the Commission received greater power to penalize
insider trading and other select securities law violations.30 In its proposal
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors”).
19. Wynne, supra note 16, at 2118 (citing About the SEC: What We Do, SEC, available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2013)).
20. Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Securi-
ties Enforcement Forum 2014 (Oct. 14, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543156675#_ftnref20).
21. Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating The Mission: A Critical Review Of
The History And Evolution Of The SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 367, 371, n.10 (2008).
22. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
5, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2006.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
23. The procedures governing such proceedings are found principally in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551 et seq. (2012), and in the Commission’s Rules of
Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201 (2015).
24. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 372.
25. STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 18, § 4:42 (last updated Sept. 2014) (citing
Theodore A. Levine, Ralph C. Ferrara & James J. Moylan, Administrative Proceedings
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 MERCER L. REV. 671, 674–85 (1974)).
26. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.110 (2015).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(l) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77i. (2006 &
Supp. V 2011); STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 18, § 4:42 (last updated Sept. 2014)
(citing Section 25 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77i (2012)).
28. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 1, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
29. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, § 1, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
30. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 383–85.
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for a third expansion of enforcement authority, much of which became
the Securities and Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act
of 1990 (“Reform Act”),31 the SEC sought and eventually received the
power to (1) impose monetary penalties in administrative proceedings in-
volving violations of securities law against entities directly regulated by
the SEC; (2) issue temporary and permanent cease-and-desist orders
against regulated and non-regulated entities; and (3) “seek orders from
federal district courts prohibiting persons who violate certain antifraud
provisions from serving as officers and directors of reporting companies
upon a showing of substantial unfitness.”32
Just as significant, however, is what the SEC sought in its first Reform
Act proposal that it did not receive: the power to seek or impose mone-
tary penalties in administrative proceedings against entities that the Com-
mission did not directly regulate.33 When the SEC initially offered its
recommendations for the legislation, it advocated for the inclusion of
such power and separately proposed guidelines that it would use to deter-
mine when to seek monetary penalties.34 The agency stressed that it
would not pursue such penalties in every administrative proceeding and
“explained that penalties should be assessed against [non-regulated enti-
ties] only in the rare situation where the [entity] received a ‘direct eco-
nomic benefit’ from the fraud.”35 Even in those circumstances, the
Commission said, it would refrain from seeking penalties if “the passage
of time and resulting shareholder turnover” weighed against their imposi-
tion.36 True to the SEC’s primary goal since its creation,37 the Commis-
sion would always analyze whether seeking penalties was “in the public
interest,” along with at least six other factors.38
But consistent with Congress’s wishes, the SEC modified its recom-
mendations in the succeeding months, removing its request for power to
pursue monetary penalties against non-regulated entities in administra-
tive proceedings.39 Under the revised legislative framework, the Commis-
sion could still seek such penalties “but only in federal court
proceedings.”40 This revised proposal eventually became the Reform
Act.41 These revisions make clear that Congress wanted to ensure that a
judicial check—independent of the SEC’s in-house court system—existed
to constrain the Commission’s monetary penalty-seeking power:
31. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
32. STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 18, § 6:1 (last updated Sept. 2014).
33. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 389–94.
34. Id. at 389–90.
35. Id. at 390.
36. Id.
37. See Wynne, supra note 16, at 2116–17.
38. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 391.
39. Id. at 392.
40. Id. at 393.
41. Id. at 392.
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The concern among members of Congress and internally at the SEC
was that if the same remedies were available to the SEC under both
judicial and administrative proceedings, then the SEC might be per-
ceived to have an incentive to conduct more enforcement actions
through its own administrative proceedings, rather than before a fed-
eral district court judge. The final legislation did not include penalty
authority in administrative proceedings precisely because there
would be no oversight by Article III judges as there would be in civil
proceedings.42
As a result of these procedural safeguards and the SEC’s general en-
forcement philosophy, the Commission brought only four actions mone-
tary penalties cases against non-regulated entities between 1990 and 2002,
and the amount of penalties sought totaled less than $5 million.43
B. THE 1993 AND 1995 REVISIONS TO THE SEC’S
RULES OF PRACTICE
The Reform Act greatly increased the SEC’s administrative power, but
its own procedural Rules of Practice proved a separate obstacle to exer-
cising that power.44 The amount of administrative proceedings increased
throughout the 1980s and, as a result, the amount of appeals from those
proceedings to the Commission increased.45 The SEC subsequently or-
ganized a Task Force on Administrative Proceedings to “identify sources
of delay in those proceedings and to recommend steps to make the adju-
dicatory process more efficient and effective.”46 The Task Force issued a
1993 report finding that, between 1982 and 1990, the time the Commis-
sion took to finish appeals from ALJ decisions had increased by 75%.47
Further, the Commission issued only 22 decisions in 1990, though that
number had begun to increase steadily by 1993.48
The Task Force, therefore, recommended revisions to the Rules of
Practice that governed its administrative proceedings in order to increase
the proceedings’ efficiency.49 These revisions, along with further revisions
made in 1995, introduced many of the procedural devices that respon-
dents bemoan today, the most significant of which were the Guidelines
for the Timely Completion of Proceedings.50 Among other things, these
revisions provided for streamlined discovery process, authorized ALJs to
issue subpoenas calling for the production of documents at the prehear-
ing stage, and allowed ALJs ten months from the issuance of order for
42. Id. at 393–94.
43. Id. at 394.
44. See STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 18, § 4:1.
45. Id.
46. Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 33,163, 55 SEC Docket 1001 (Nov. 5,
1993).
47. See STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 18, § 4:1.
48. Id.
49. Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 33,163, 55 SEC Docket 1001 (Nov. 5,
1993).
50. Id.
514 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
administrative proceedings to issue a decision.51 However, the new adju-
dication deadlines are not inflexible, especially in complex matters, and
can be extended “for good cause.”52 Further, the SEC said that the guide-
lines would “need to be examined periodically and may need to be read-
justed in light of changes in the Commission’s case load and the
availability of Commission resources.”53 The SEC again revised its Rules
of Practice in 2003, and it further shortened ALJ and Commission deci-
sion-issuance deadlines, along with certain brief-filing deadlines.54
C. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
Enacted in July 2002 after several prominent corporate scandals,55 the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act represented another significant expansion of the
SEC’s enforcement authority.56 Beginning with the 1990 Reform Act, the
Commission could deprive securities law violators of ill-gotten gains
through “disgorgement” in an administrative proceeding.57 This enforce-
ment mechanism is not considered a monetary penalty but rather an equi-
table remedy.58 After the Reform Act’s passage, the Commission
typically made disgorged funds available “for restitution and other relief
for those harmed by [a] defendant’s misconduct.”59 Section 308(a) of
Sarbanes-Oxley took that concept one step further by adding monetary
penalties to a “Fair Fund” for restitution and relief, provided that dis-
gorgement had also occurred.60 Thus, the SEC could not make the mone-
tary penalties available when disgorgement had not taken place, despite
the fact that the Commission had requested such authority.61
About one year after Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage, the SEC proposed
amendments to the act that would grant the Commission power to add
monetary penalties to Fair Funds even when no disgorgement occurred.62




54. Securities Act Release No. 8240, Exchange Act Release No. 2137, Investment
Company Act Release No. 34-48,018, 80 SEC Docket 1266 (June 11, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg.
35787 (July 17, 2003).
55. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 394–95.
56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
57. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(e) (2000)).
58. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 386.
59. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 1, at 753–54.
60. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012).
61. It’s only FAIR: Returning Money to Defrauded Investors: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 108th Cong. 5 (2003) (statement of Stephen Cutler, Director of Enforcement, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
62. See Press Release, Congressman Richard Baker, Oxley Introduce Bill To
Strengthen SEC Powers Against Securities Fraud, Return Funds To Defrauded Investors
(May 21, 2003), available at http:// web.archive.org/web/20030602192406/www.baker.house
.gov/News /fair_bill.htm.
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unwillingness” to revisit Sarbanes-Oxley.63 Of course, such power would
have only given the SEC further motivation to seek monetary penalties as
a quasi-equitable remedy, though such penalties are actually punitive and
more speculative in nature.64
Section 308(a) had the obvious upside of making more money available
to victims of securities law violations.65 Of course, it provided even fur-
ther incentive to use administrative proceedings for seeking monetary
penalties against entities that the SEC directly regulated.66 Therefore,
one primary disincentive to bringing administrative proceedings against
non-regulated entities remained: the SEC could still only seek monetary
penalties through a district court proceeding.67
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF SEC ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT
After Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage, the SEC made full use of the Fair
Fund provision,68 pursuing large monetary penalties through settlement
as well as administrative and federal court proceedings more aggressively
than at any other point in the Commission’s existence.69 The SEC imme-
diately levied its first $10 million monetary penalty against a public com-
pany in its 2002 settlement with Xerox.70 In 2004, it collected forty
penalties in that range or greater.71 According to one study, penalties
have increased by at least 30% year-over-year since 2000, though the
Commission’s caseload only grew 3% year-over-year over the same
period.72
In a 2006 Statement Concerning Financial Penalties, the SEC said that
one of its primary considerations when collecting penalties would be
“[t]he degree to which the penalty will recompense or further harm the
injured shareholders”;73 regardless, deterring wrongdoers and collecting
penalties appeared to be the Commission’s primary objectives.74 That
same year, one commentator noted that, “[t]oday, a $10 million SEC pen-
alty would probably be considered a ‘victory’ for most entities settling
63. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 397–98 & n.170.
64. See id. at 397–99.
65. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 1, at 754.
66. Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a) (2012).
68. See STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 18, § 6.8.
69. See id. § 2:1.
70. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 399–400.
71. Id. at 400 (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2004 Performance & Accountability
Report (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar04.pdf).
72. See Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,”
But What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124
YALE L.J. 209, 209–10 (2014).
73. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
Concerning Fin. Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/ news/press/2006-4
.htm.
74. See Steinway, supra note 72, at 213–14.
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SEC fraud charges.”75 Today, the U.S. Treasury General Fund receives a
“vast majority” of the sums that the SEC collects, and the Commission
contributes more money to that fund than any other government
agency.76 The following subsections discuss the Dodd-Frank Act and how
it united the Commission’s increased emphasis on collecting penalties
with an increased emphasis on bringing cases administratively.
A. THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Following a period of economic downturn and political pressure to
more strictly regulate financial institutions, President Barack Obama
signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank) into law in July 2010.77 Dodd-Frank expanded the
SEC’s authority in a variety of ways.78 Most significantly, the Act gave
the SEC the authority to pursue monetary penalties against non-regu-
lated entities through administrative proceedings, rather than strictly in
federal court.79 It gave the SEC more power to impose secondary liability
for employees aiding their company’s illegal activity.80 It gave the SEC
and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) more
power to regulate foreign private accounting firms.81 And it allowed the
SEC to award whistleblowers with funds not earmarked for disgorgement
or the Fair Fund.82
Again, the SEC had already sought such penalty authority in its first
1990 Reform Act proposal.83 But Congress did not want to give the SEC
that authority specifically “because the SEC might be perceived to have
an incentive to conduct more enforcement actions through its own ad-
ministrative proceedings.”84 Indeed, the SEC now had both the authority
and, given the Commission’s increased emphasis on collecting monetary
penalties, even greater incentive than it had in 1990 to use internal, ad-
ministrative proceedings.85
75. Id. at 210 (citing Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks
Before the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (Feb. 16, 2006) (transcript available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech /spch021606psa.htm).
76. Id. at 210–11 (citing SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, FY 2014 Congressional Budget
Justification 18 n.1 (2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudg
just.pdf).
77. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1802 (2010); see Helene Cooper, Obama Signs a Contentious Overhaul
of the U.S. Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B3.
78. The Dodd-Frank Act Reinforces and Expands SEC Enforcement Powers, GIBSON
DUNN (July 21, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Dodd-FrankActRein
forcesAndExpandsSECEnforcementPowers.aspx.
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2012) (Section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act amending
§ 8A of the Securities Act, § 21B(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, § 9(d)(1) of the In-
vestment Company Act, and § 203(i)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act).
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See Steinway, supra note 72, at 217–18.
83. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 389–94.
84. Id. at 393–94.
85. See Steinway, supra note 72, at 213–14.
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B. A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF SEC ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS, POST-DODD-FRANK
In the years following Dodd-Frank, the SEC began consistently in-
creasing the amount of cases it brought against non-regulated entities
through administrative proceedings.86 In the fiscal year 2012, the Com-
mission instituted 462 administrative proceedings;87 in 2013, 469;88 and in
2014, 616.89 Even from quarter to quarter of each year, the amount of in-
house cases was increasing. One study found that, from January to March
2013, administrative proceedings made up 25% of the SEC’s total
caseload.90 From October to December 2013, however, the study found
that they made up 56% of the Commission’s caseload.91 One SEC official
commented that it is “fair to say” that the increased use of administrative
proceedings is “the new normal.”92
86. Different studies of SEC enforcement proceeding statistics find different adminis-
trative proceeding totals. Joshua Gallu, SEC Accounting Doesn’t Add Up in 2011 Enforce-
ment Record, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2012-03-02/sec-accounting-of-record-enforcement-year-in-2011-doesn-t-add-up. Some
studies—including the SEC’s own in 2011—count “follow-on” administrative proceedings,
in which the Commission simply “institute[s] penalties in cases that already had been
brought,” and “delinquent filings” cases, which do not take the Division of Enforcement as
much time to pursue. Id. Further, a large number of civil actions and administrative pro-
ceedings are settled—though an entity’s decision to settle is often motivated by the SEC’s
impressive win rate. Nearly every study, however, reaches the same general conclusions.
87. Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2012, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 3 tbl.3
(2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2012.pdf.
88. Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2013, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 3 tbl.2
(2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2013.pdf.
89. Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2014, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 3 tbl.2
(2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2012.pdf.
90. Lawrence S. Bader & Peter Janowski, SEC Enforcement Data Analyses: Analyses
of Cases Filed by the SEC in Calendar Year 2014, MORVILLO ABRAMOWITZ (July 7, 2014),
available at http://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/00373.
91. Id.
92. Eaglesham, supra note 2, at A1.
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As one might expect, the SEC was experiencing much greater success
in its administrative proceedings than it was in federal court.94 In fiscal
year 2014, during which the SEC began its yearlong 100% administrative
proceeding win streak, the Commission won only 61% of the cases that it
brought in federal court.95 That same year, the SEC won all six adminis-
trative hearings that came to verdict.96 By contrast, the Commission won
only 11 out of 18 cases in district court.97 Finally, a recent Wall Street
Journal study found that from October 2010 to March2015, the SEC won
90 percent of contested cases that progressed before an administrative
law judge compared to a 69 percent success rate in federal court over the
same timeframe.98 Respondents’ appeals to SEC administrative decisions
fared worse: “[t]he [SEC] commissioners decided in their own agency’s
favor concerning 53 out of 56 defendants in appeals—or 95%—from Jan-
uary 2010 through [March 2015].”99
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF SEC ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT, POST-DODD-FRANK
Thus, following several significant pieces of legislation, the SEC has
clearly strayed far from the philosophy that its Division of Enforcement
embraced in the 1990s, when the SEC originally received the power to
pursue monetary penalties for most securities law violations.100
Given the SEC’s increased use of administrative proceedings and its
success in those proceedings (compared to its success in district court),
some commentators and practitioners began to question the fairness of
the in-house court system.101 Some focused on the fact that the judges
were on the SEC’s payroll and how unlikely it is that federal judges
would reverse an ALJ’s decision.102 Others focused on the SEC’s Rules
of Practice and the ways in which the quick discovery and decision peri-
ods, among other things, disadvantaged respondents.103 One Manhattan
federal judge said that, with its use of administrative courts, the SEC was
becoming “a law unto itself” and added he saw no reason to replace fed-
94. See Morgenson, supra note 7.
95. See Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Criticizes SEC Use of In-House Court for Fraud
Cases, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2014, 1:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/sec-
fraud-rakoff-idUSL1N0SV2LN20141105.




98. See Jean Eaglesham, In-House Judges Help SEC Rack Up Wins — Success rate for
agency is 90%, and if it loses, it can appeal to its commissioners, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2015,
at A1.
99. Id.
100. See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 21, at 392.
101. See Morgenson, supra note 7 (noting that, “[a]s a securities lawyer, I’ve been in-
volved in these administrative proceedings for many years and have been struck by the
unfairness and lack of neutrality in the system . . . . The judges’ mind-set reflects the
agenda of the agency, which in this arena is enforcement”).
102. See id.
103. See Henning, supra note 3.
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eral courts with “administrative fiat.”104
More recently, several respondents have lodged constitutional chal-
lenges to the administrative system.105 The SEC denies that its current
procedures are improper,106 but as it shifts more enforcement actions in-
house, the critics will only grow louder. The following subsections will
analyze the problems with the SEC’s use of the administrative proceed-
ings as they exist today.
A. DISTRICT COURT STANDING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Respondents that challenge these administrative proceedings on consti-
tutional grounds first deal with the threshold issue of whether they must
exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking recourse in federal
court. So far, they have experienced mixed success.107 Federal courts
have original jurisdiction over claims arising under the Constitution.108
However, Congress can evidence an intent to restrict that original juris-
diction if the “‘statutory scheme’ displays a ‘fairly discernible’ intent to
limit jurisdiction, and the claims at issue ‘are of the type Congress in-
tended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure.’”109 In order for a
constitutional claim against the SEC to receive an immediate ruling,
therefore, (1) “a finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judi-
cial review;” (2) the claim must be “wholly collateral to a statute’s review
provisions;” and (3) the claims must be “outside the agency’s
expertise.”110
  The first two prongs of this test, drawn from Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Reich,111 have so far proved formidable stumbling blocks for administra-
tive respondents.
In Gupta v. S.E.C., a New York district court said that the administra-
tive respondent had standing to bring his equal protection112 challenge in
federal court.113 First, the court said the SEC ALJ’s expertise did not
encompass constitutional challenges such as Gupta’s.114 Second, Gupta
alleged the SEC “irrationally and illegally” singled him out for an admin-
104. See Raymond, supra note 95 (internal quotations omitted).
105. See generally Complaint, Duka v. S.E.C., No. 15-357 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2015);
Complaint, Bebo v. S.E.C., No. 15-00003 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 2, 2015); Complaint, Stilwell v.
S.E.C., No. 14-07931 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014); Complaint, Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. S.E.C., No:
1:15-cv-0492-CAP (N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2015).
106. Andrew Ceresney, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21,
2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297#.VMnn
AWjF9zM.
107. See Chau v. S.E.C., No. 14-CV-1903, 2014 WL 6984236 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014);
see also Gupta v. S.E.C., 796 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
109. PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 489 (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200,
207, 212 (“Thunder Basin”) (1994)).
110. Id.
111. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 212.
112. See U.S.  CONST. amend. V.
113. See Gupta v. S.E.C., 796 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
114. Id. at 512.
2015] Fight over Home Court 521
istrative proceeding out of a host of defendants.115 The court found that
claim satisfied the wholly collateral requirement because Gupta would
have an equal protection requirement regardless of whether he received
an adverse ALJ ruling.116 Before Gupta received a ruling on the merits of
his claim, however, the SEC voluntarily terminated its administrative ac-
tion and refiled in federal court.117
Though the Second Circuit has never discussed the ruling’s merits, the
Gupta decision has only been cited negatively by sister courts.118 In Chau
v. S.E.C., the administrative respondent asserted both due process and
equal protection claims, but the district court ruled it did not have sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.119 First, it said Gupta properly
resisted a “black-and-white” rule and that “the question of whether a spe-
cial statutory scheme provides for adequate review of administrative ac-
tions involves case-specific determinations.”120 But the due process
claim—that respondent did not have enough time to prepare for the pro-
ceeding—was not collateral primarily because the claim was “central to
[the agency’s] day-to-day conduct” within the case.121 In addition, both
claims fell within agency expertise, and the court seemed persuaded by
the fact that Chau could eventually attain standing in federal court after
he exhausted his administrative remedies via 15 U.S.C. 78y, which states:
A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission entered pur-
suant to this chapter may obtain review of the order in the United
States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has his
principal place of business, or for the District of Columbia Circuit, by
filing in such court, within sixty days after the entry of the order, a
written petition requesting that the order be modified or set aside in
whole or in part.122
The ongoing case of S.E.C. v. Bebo addressed for the first time the
issue of Appointments Clause challenge standing in federal court prior to
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.123 The results were decidedly
mixed: the district court judge labeled the administrative respondent’s
claims “compelling and meritorious” but said that “whether [the equal
protection claim] is correct cannot be resolved here.”124 The court ruled
that the administrative respondent must first litigate the claims before the
SEC and then, if necessary, on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
115. Id.
116. Id. at 513.
117. See Henning, supra note 3.
118. See Salazar v. Duncan, No. 14-1230, 2015 WL 252078 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2015); see
also Chau v. S.E.C., No. 14-CV-1903, 2014 WL 6984236 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014).
119. See Chau, 2014 WL 6984236.
120. Id. at *5.
121. Id. at *9.
122. Id. at *11–13.
123. See generally Bebo v. S.E.C., No. 15–C–3, 2015 WL 905349 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3,
2015).
124. Id. at *2.
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Seventh Circuit.125
The court applied the three-prong Thunder Basin test, it held that a
finding of preclusion would not foreclose all meaningful judicial review,
and it distinguished Bebo from Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),126 in which no agency review was
required prior to review of an Appointments Clause claim in federal
court, in several ways.127 First, it noted that in PCAOB, the SEC had no
action pending against the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs would otherwise
have to induce SEC action to open up a pathway to agency review.128
Further, not every Board action is encapsulated in a final Commission
order or rule.129 By contrast, Bebo would not have to induce an adminis-
trative proceeding, and ever ALJ ruling is made final when it is issued by
the Commission.130 And if the SEC’s final order did not resolve Bebo’s
claims to her satisfaction, “the Exchange Act [in 15 U.S.C. 78y] provides
that a ‘person aggrieved’ by a final SEC order ‘may obtain review of the
order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he
resides or has his principal place of business.’”131
The appeals statute, § 78y, is the trump card to all of these requests for
federal court review prior to the exhaustion of all administrative reme-
dies132. The Commission’s ALJs can address the constitutional arguments
in a motion for summary within the administrative proceeding, as an ALJ
later suggested in Bebo’s case, and an appeals court will hear the claim of
a dissatisfied administrative respondent if the respondent files a timely
post-order appeal.133 Therefore, meaningful judicial review will virtually
always exist, and the claim would fail the first prong of the Thunder Basin
test.
In Hill v. SEC, the federal court found that it did have jurisdiction to
review the plaintiff’s Appointments Clause claims because § 78y did not,
in fact, provide meaningful judicial review.134 This case was significant
because it was the first in which a federal judge held both that the court
had jurisdiction over a constitutional claim and that the plaintiff was
likely to succeed on the merits of that claim.135 The court reached its
jurisdictional conclusion by pointing out that “delayed judicial review
here will cause an allegedly unconstitutional process to occur.”136 But this
ruling seems like a strained interpretation of the “meaningful judicial re-
125. Id.
126. See generally Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB),
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
127. Bebo, 2015 WL 905349, at *2–4.
128. Id. at *2–3.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *2; see 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012).
132. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78y.
133. Id.
134. See Order, Hill v. S.E.C., No. 15-cv-1801-LMM (N.D. Ga. 2015).
135. See id.
136. Id. at 18.
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view” test. It is true that the allegedly unconstitutional process will have
occurred, but the administrative ruling can then be appealed to federal
court and dealt with appropriately. If the federal court can later hear the
case and later undo the effects of an unconstitutional process, “meaning-
ful judicial review” will have occurred.
However, strong policy reasons still exist for immediate federal court
review. For both regulated and non-regulated entities, winning a securi-
ties case in federal court after the exhaustion of all other remedies may
be “little more than a Pyrrhic victory.”137 All the clients and business will
have already left, and the respondent will have nothing left to fight for. If
an administrative respondent could prove that such a scenario would
come to pass by the end of the Commission’s proceedings, the respondent
could argue that judicial review would no longer be meaningful. Immedi-
ate federal review on a case-by-case basis would provide a check to that
problem.
B. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUES
Since Dodd-Frank, at least four respondents in SEC administrative
proceedings have argued in their district court requests for injunction that
the SEC’s administrative proceedings fail to adequately protect their
Equal Protection and Due Process rights.138 Primarily, their equal protec-
tion complaints have alleged that the SEC “intentionally treated differ-
ently from others similarly situated and that that there is no rational basis
for the disparate treatment.139 The due process complaints, often coupled
with equal protection challenges, allege that the SEC chose the adminis-
trative forum because the Commission could not sustain the evidentiary
burdens of federal court and because other procedural devices, such as
the accelerated procedural speed, give the Commission an insurmounta-
ble advantage.140 Such procedural complaints are valid in many cases,
and district courts should examine the validity of due process claims by
considering how the SEC typically handles similar cases and how greatly
the forum disadvantaged the respondent.
1. Due Process Challenges and Procedural Disadvantages
Some administrative respondents advance another fairly straightfor-
ward argument: that the SEC’s administrative proceedings lack signifi-
137. See Steinway, supra note 72, at 213–14 (citing Linda Greenhouse, Justices Unani-
mously Overturn Conviction of Arthur Andersen, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, http://www
.nytimes.com/2005/05/31/business/31wire-andersen.html).
138. See Complaint at 1–5, Bebo v. S.E.C., No. 15-00003 (E.D. Wis. 2015); see also
Chau v. S.E.C., No. 14-CV-1903, 2014 WL 6984236 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014); Peixoto v.
S.E.C., No. 14-8364 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Gupta v. S.E.C., 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 514 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
139. Chau, 2014 WL 6984236 at *10 n. 110 (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528
U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603 (2008) (restricting
“class of one” claims in the public employment context, in part based on the “discretion
that [public employers] are entrusted to exercise”)).
140. See Complaint at 1–5, Bebo v. S.E.C., No. 15-00003 (E.D. Wis. 2015).
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cant procedural protections afforded in federal court to a degree that
violates the Constitution’s due process clause. At least one New York
federal district court judge, Judge Jed Rakoff, has made comments sug-
gesting he’d be willing to entertain such an argument.141 Rakoff noted in
particular that it would be unwise to displace a “constitutional alternative
with administrative fiat.” The Commission’s ALJs may soon have a much
greater influence on securities law doctrine’s development, he said, be-
cause of how the SEC’s procedural rules disadvantage administrative re-
spondents, because of the SEC’s increased preference for administrative
proceedings, and because of the deference federal courts afford agen-
cies.142 That is unfair to administrative respondents and federal court de-
fendants alike.
a. ALJ Decision Deadlines
The SEC administrative courts’ unrealistic time constraints relating to
decision issuances are perhaps the forum’s most prominent procedural
disadvantage.143 Commission ALJs have either 120, 200, or 300 days from
service to render an initial decision, and the SEC decides which of those
three timelines it wants generally based on the complexity of the matter
and the need for expediency.144 Everything between service and decision
must be completed within that period: “[d]iscovery, trial preparation, pre-
hearing conferences, the hearing itself, post-hearing briefing, and submis-
sion of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.”145 Unless they
ask for an extension, ALJs must issue a decision by the prescribed dead-
line, whereas federal judges follow no statutorily imposed deadline.146
This problem will only worsen now that the SEC is bringing disclosure
and financial reporting fraud in-house.147
Another problem related to proceeding speed is that the post-service
time for settlement negotiations is compressed.148 And, unlike ALJs, dis-
trict court judges work with magistrate judges who can oversee those ne-
gotiations.149 Given all of these time pressures, administrative
respondents are more likely to settle, even if they think that their case has
merit.
141. Raymond, supra note 95.
142. Id.
143. See Henning, supra note 3.
144. SEC Rule of Practice 360(a)(2).
145. Alan M. Lieberman, Fast-Track Justice: Is The SEC Exercising ‘Unchecked And
Unbalanced Power’?, 20 No. 10 WESTLAW J. SEC. LITIG. & REG. 1, at *3 (Sept. 18, 2014).
146. Id.
147. Id. at *4 (citing In re Airtouch Commc’ns, AP File No. 3-16033 (2014); In re Cum-
mings, AP File No. 3-15991 (2014); In re Sherman, AP File No. 3-15992 (2014); In re Neely,
AP File No. 3-15945 (2014)).
148. Id. at *3.
149. See Lieberman, supra note 145, at *5.
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b. Discovery Limitations
Additionally, discovery is greatly limited because respondents cannot
conduct depositions of expert witnesses and because the ALJ has discre-
tion to allow all other witnesses to be deposed.150 In order to conduct any
depositions, the respondent must submit a “written motion setting forth
the reasons why such deposition should be taken, including the specific
reasons why the party believes the witness will be unable to attend or
testify at the hearing.”151 Thus, if the SEC has already talked with a fact
witness and the ALJ deems a deposition unnecessary, a respondent, who
lacks subpoena power, must independently contact the witness for an in-
formal conversation.152
And because of the decision issuance deadlines, petitioners are at a
disadvantage in gathering documents and getting in touch with potential
witnesses.153 While the SEC may take months or years to prepare their
case, the accused’s discovery clock starts upon service.154 Respondents
are therefore not only forced to anticipate that the SEC will file an action
against them but also that the Commission will do so administratively.155
Other jurisdictional problems with administrative discovery rights ex-
ist. In Bebo v. S.E.C., an action requesting injunction that is pending in
federal court, the administrative respondent alleges that the proceedings
infringe on its individual due process rights because five important wit-
nesses reside in Canada.156 The SEC administrative court’s subpoena
powers do not extend beyond the United States, whereas in federal court,
it could submit letters rogatory and very likely obtain the deposition testi-
mony sought.157 Such circumstances could at least tempt the SEC to bring
a case administratively when the Commission knows that doing so will
deprive the administrative respondent access to key witnesses.
c. Absence of a Right to Trial by Jury
Additionally, respondents in these proceedings have no right to trial by
jury.158 That right is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution159 and the Fed-
150. RP 233(a–b), 17 C.F.R. § 201.233(a–b) (2015); see Lieberman, supra note 145, at
*3–4.
151. RP 233(a), 17 C.F.R. § 201.233(a) (2015).
152. William F. Johnson & Amelia R. Medina, SEC’s Administrative Enforcement In-






156. See Complaint at 24–25, Bebo v. S.E.C., No. 15-00003 (E.D. Wis. 2015).
157. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b), which only authorizes “attendance of witnesses
and the production of any such records . . . from any place in the United States or any
State”).
158. Johnson & Medina, supra note 152.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
526 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in certain federal court proceedings.160 As
one administrative respondent pointed out in its federal pleading, “the
legislative history regarding Section 929P(a)161 of Dodd-Frank confirms
that . . . Congress[ ]” specifically provided the SEC with an administrative
cause of action directly parallel to a federal cause of action.162 The history
reflects that Section 929P(a) makes “the SEC’s authority in administra-
tive penalty proceedings coextensive with its authority to seek penalties
in federal court.”163 Therefore, a government agency can pursue the same
cause of action in two venues, and depending on the government agency’s
choice of venue, a respondent may or may not have the constitutional
right to trial by jury. If the government’s sole purpose is “to discourage
the assertion of constitutional rights[,] it is ‘patently unconstitutional.’”164
Here, the SEC has removed the chance to assert an “inviolate” constitu-
tional right altogether and the SEC receives no disadvantage for that re-
moval.165 When an administrative respondent is the only case among
many arising out of the same cause of action and when a jury would
clearly favor the respondent, an issue of Equal Protection exists.
d. Looser Evidentiary Standards
Further, ALJs have broad discretion to introduce evidence, including
hearsay, that would not be admitted in federal court.166 These looser
standards often result in administrative proceedings being “based on
purely circumstantial evidence, sometimes without a single witness who
can relate firsthand knowledge of any wrongdoing by the respondent.”167
At least one commentator has labeled this rule as neutral in theory but an
“entirely one-sided” investigative examination in practice.168 This is espe-
cially true given that the respondent may not be able to depose those
witnesses before the proceeding.169 This problem, along with all the due
process problems that this Article discusses, is compounded by the fact
that Commission-reviewed ALJ decisions enjoy considerable deference
upon appeal to a court of appeals.170
160. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) (“The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution—or provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the
parties inviolate.”).
161. Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 27(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
162. See Complaint at 22, Bebo v. S.E.C., No. 15-00003, at 22 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 2, 2015).
163. H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 78 (2010).
164. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 n.20 (1973).
165. See Lieberman, supra note 145, at *4.
166. S.E.C. Rules of Practice 320, 17 C.F.R. § 201.233 (2006); see, e.g., In re Forten-
berry, Adm. Proc. File No. 3-15858, at *2 (2014) (“[E]vidence is presumptively
admissible.”).
167. Johnson & Medina, supra note 152.
168. Lieberman, supra note 145, at *4.
169. S.E.C. Rules of Practice 233(a), 17 C.F.R. § 201.233(a).
170. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45
(1984) (holding that “a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provi-
sion for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency”).
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2. Equal protection claims
Several administrative respondents have premised equal protection
claims on the fact that “it was constitutionally improper for the SEC to
pursue charges against [them] administratively while bringing similar
cases in Article III courts.”171 Plaintiffs draw this claim primarily from
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech in which the Supreme Court held that
“successful equal protection claims [may be] brought by a ‘class of one,’
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differ-
ently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment.”172 Thus, even if the SEC had the discretion
to pursue a particular claim in administrative court, the SEC may not
necessarily be entitled to that choice of venue if it treated a respondent
unequally and if “the unequal treatment was still arbitrary and
irrational.”173
The merits of these claims have not yet been decided. The plaintiff in
Gupta successfully established standing in part because he was the only
one of twenty-nine associated parties whose case was brought administra-
tively.174 However, the court in Chau distinguished its equal protection
claim from Gupta primarily because Chau could only identify three asso-
ciated parties whose cases weren’t brought administratively, though the
merits of the claim were not actually decided since the court held it had
no jurisdiction over the claim.175
3. Chevron deference
Once these due process and equal protection claims gain standing in
federal court, however, they must overcome the great deference that fed-
eral courts afford agencies like the SEC, derived from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.176
This landmark administrative decision stands for the proposition that “a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for
a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”177
Federal judges, particularly in the lower courts, will not be eager to rule
against the SEC on either of these grounds, particularly Ultimately, the
primary problem with any due process claim is that Congress knowingly
gave the SEC the power to establish these procedural rules. And the pri-
mary problem with almost any equal protections claim is that Congress
knowingly gave the SEC the authority to choose its litigation forum.
171. Chau v. S.E.C., 2014 WL 6984236 at *10.
172. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564–66 (2000); see also Engquist v. Or.
Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603 (2008).
173. Gupta v. S.E.C., 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
174. Id.
175. Id. at *10.
176. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(“Chevron”) (1984).
177. Id. at 844–45.
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Thus, the SEC and Congress may ultimately need to be the ones who
provide the remedy for these issues.
C. APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE ISSUES
Several other petitioners have lodged broader constitutional attacks178
that focus on whether the SEC’s in-house judges are inferior executive
officers and whether the president retains sufficient authority over the
Commission’s ALJs under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.179
This subsection will analyze the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB)180 and discuss why the court found that ALJs are inferior ex-
ecutive officers and why the decision dictates that the ALJs’ two layers of
for-cause protection render them unable to preside over the SEC’s ad-
ministrative proceedings.
1. Analyzing Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB
The Constitution’s Appointments Clause states that the President:
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Court of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.181
Though the Appointments Clause says nothing specifically about the
President’s removal powers, courts have interpreted it to mean that the
President should retain a reasonable amount of control over the removal
of inferior executive officers—as opposed to superior executive officers
under the President’s direct control.182 The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that for-cause removal, afforded to either the inferior officer or
the officer supervising that inferior officer, is constitutional.183
Generally speaking, PCAOB examined whether a scheme that affords
both the inferior officer and the officer for-cause removal protection is
constitutional under the Appointments Clause.184 In that case, the SEC
commissioners could only be removed by the president for good cause,
178. See generally Complaint, Duka v. S.E.C., No. 15-357 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Complaint,
Bebo v. S.E.C., No. 15-00003 (E.D. Wis. 2015); Complaint, Stilwell v. S.E.C., No. 14-07931
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. S.E.C., No: 1:15-cv-0492-CAP (N.D. Ga. 2015);
Tilton v. S.E.C., No. 15-cv-02472.
179. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
180. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (“PCAOB”), 561 U.S. 477
(2010).
181. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
182. PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 478–79.
183. Id. at 494.
184. Id. at 477.
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and the commissioners could only remove the PCAOB members for good
cause.185 First, the SEC held that the PCAOB were inferior officials who
exercised executive authority.186 Then, the Supreme Court said the sec-
ond layer of for-cause protection prevents the president from holding the
“[SEC] fully accountable for the Board’s conduct, to the same extent that
he may hold the [SEC] accountable for everything else that it does” be-
cause the SEC is “not responsible for the Board’s actions,” but only “for
their own determination of whether the Act’s rigorous good-cause stan-
dard is met.”187 Chief Justice Roberts, who authored the opinion, did not
strike down the entire PCAOB system but rather simply held that the
second layer of protection, insulating the PCAOB, was unconstitu-
tional.188 Further, he specifically side-stepped the issue of whether
PCAOB would apply to ALJs, leaving the case’s applicability to the
SEC’s in-house judges up for debate.189
2. Applying Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB
One commentator distilled the PCAOB decision into a four-part test,
under which this comment will analyze the constitutional validity of the
Commission ALJs’ authority: “(1) Is an inferior officer separated from
presidential removal by two or more layers of for-cause protection? . . .
(2) Does the inferior officer exercise substantial executive authority? . . .
(3) Can the inferior officer be removed for conduct that is not directly
related to his employment? . . . (4) Can the President initiate removal
proceedings?”190
a. Are SEC Administrative Law Judges Officers?
Chief Justice Roberts said that the officer status of ALJs is in question,
indicating that they might also be considered employees.191 However,
prior Supreme Court opinions have generally come to the opposite con-
clusion, though no majority opinion has explicitly said so. As Justice
Breyer pointed out in his dissent, quoting Justice Scalia’s concurring opin-
ion in Freytag v. Commissioner, ALJs “are all executive officers.”192 The
ALJs’ duties also comport with the definition of an officer provided by
the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice: “if (1) [the
185. Id. at 486–87.
186. Id. at 495.
187. Id. at 496–97.
188. Id. at 509–10.
189. Id. at 507 n.10.
190. David Moon, Note, When Does Dual For-Cause Removal Protection Become Un-
constitutional? Exploring the Scope of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Board, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 875, 899 (2013).
191. PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10.
192. Id. at 542 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)
(opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis deleted)); id. at 868
(majority opinion) (“[A] [tax-court] special trial judge is an ‘inferior Officer.’”); Edmond
v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997) (“[M]ilitary trial and appellate judges are [infer-
ior] officers.”).
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person] is invested by legal authority with a portion of the sovereign pow-
ers of the federal Government, and (2) [the person’s authority] is ‘contin-
uing,’” that person is an officer.193 Finally, the ALJs are inferior officers
by virtue of Justice Scalia’s simple test in Edmond v. United States: they
are officers, and they have superiors who “were appointed by presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”194
The SEC might argue that its administrative law judges’ inferior officer
status should be analyzed through the lens of Landry v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp.195 In that case, the D.C. Circuit Court held that under
Freytag, the FDIC ALJs were not inferior officers because they did not
have the authority to render final decisions in certain classes of cases.
However, the concurrence correctly pointed out that “[o]nly after it con-
cluded [special trial judges] were inferior officers did Freytag address the
STJ’s ability to issue a final order; the STJ’s limited authority to issue
final orders was only an additional reason, not the reason.”196 Thus, the
SEC judges’ decisions must be approved by a majority of SEC commis-
sioners, but under Freytag, that fact is not dispositive. Because of all the
Commission’s ALJs’ powers detailed in previous sections of this article,
the judges exercise significant authority and are inferior officers.
b. Are the ALJs Separated from Presidential Removal By Two or
More Layers of For-Cause Protection?
The Commission’s ALJs can be removed from their position “only” for
“good cause,” as “established and determined” by the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board (MSPB).197 The SEC commissioners, who exercise removal
power, cannot be removed by the President except for “inefficiency, neg-
lect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”198 Finally, the MSPB, which re-
views the exercise of that removal power, can be removed by the
President “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in of-
fice.”199 Therefore, it appears that the ALJs receive at least two layers of
for-cause removal protection. These statutes also indicate (1) that the in-
ferior officers, the ALJs, cannot be removed for conduct that is not di-
rectly related to their employment and (2) that the President cannot
initiate removal proceedings.200 Further attenuating the ALJs’ connec-
tion to the president, the SEC Commissioners cannot appoint the judges
without the prior approval of the SEC’s Office of Personal Manage-
193. Officers within the Meaning of the Appointment Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2007/04/31/ appoint-
mentsclausev10.pdf.
194. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
195. Landry v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
196. See Hill v. S.E.C. (generally citing Landry, 204 F.3d at 1140, 1141).
197. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
198. See PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 487; see also MFS Sec. Corp. v. S.E.C., 380 F.3d 611,
619–20 (2d Cir. 2004).
199. 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012).
200. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1202(d), 7521(a).
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ment.201 That leaves only one hurdle.
c. Do the ALJs Exercise Substantial Executive Authority?
 The “substantial executive authority” step—discussing whether ALJs
are executive officers despite their traditionally adjudicative functions—
inspired a most spirited Supreme Court debate. In a footnote, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts indicated that he did not believe the PCAOB ruling applied
to ALJs202 because, “unlike members of the Board, many administrative
law judges of course perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or
policymaking functions, or possess purely recommendatory powers.”203
Justice Breyer disagreed, warning that the PCAOB ruling could provide a
legitimate basis on which respondents could challenge many ALJ sys-
tems.204 Breyer took issue with Roberts’s assertion that the Board does
not perform adjudicative functions because Breyer believed that the
PCAOB did perform some adjudicative functions, such as disciplining
and sanctioning, alongside its executive and legislative functions.205 And
absent that distinguishing “adjudicative function” factor, the Commis-
sion’s ALJ two-layer system of for-cause protection appears
unconstitutional.
However, at least one commentator suggests that Chief Justice Roberts
distinguished the PCAOB and ALJs because the ALJs perform “purely”
adjudicative functions—presumably making appropriate the additional
insulation from the threat of removal—whereas the PCAOB performed a
mixture of adjudicative, executive, and legislative functions.206 However,
that commentator also concedes that such a reading requires inserting a
parenthetical “in addition” into Chief Justice Roberts’s footnote, causing
it to read: “unlike members of the Board, many administrative law judges
of course perform adjudicative rather than [in addition to their] enforce-
ment or policymaking functions.”207
It is possible to read into Roberts’s footnote a legal distinction between
the PCAOB and ALJs, but that distinction cannot be found in the plain
language of the opinion. Such a reading requires the insertion of an awk-
ward but obvious parenthetical. Reading the plain language of the opin-
ion, it appears that Justice Breyer’s interpretation is correct. Chief Justice
Roberts simply made a forced, incorrect analysis about the PCAOB’s du-
201. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (“An agency may appoint an individual to an administrative law
judge position only with prior approval of OPM, except when it makes its selection from
the list of eligibles provided by OPM. An administrative law judge receives a career ap-
pointment and is exempt from the probationary period requirements under part 315 of this
chapter.”).
202. Likewise, the SEC stresses that its ALJs are independent judicial officers. See Of-
fice of Admin. Law Judges, About the Office, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec
.gov/alj (last updated Nov. 25, 2014).
203. PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10.
204. See id. at 541–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205. See id. at 530–31.
206. Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391,
2048, 2412 n.117 (2011).
207. Id. (citation omitted).
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ties. Were this issue of the SEC administrative system’s validity taken to
the Supreme Court, it is possible that the Court would still distinguish the
Commission’s ALJs based on policy concerns, such as the need to “insu-
late those with adjudicative functions with good-cause removal protec-
tions.”208 But the PCAOB decision does not itself provide sufficient
grounds for such a differentiation, and lower courts should therefore rule
in favor of respondents’ Appointments Clause challenges.
Even if a court decided in an administrative respondent’s favor on an
Appointments Clause challenge, however, the court would likely follow
other courts’ lead and remove the SEC ALJs’ for-cause protection. The
case would then probably be remanded back to the in-house court from
which the respondent sought to escape. Thus, while such challenges might
deter the SEC from bringing a case administratively, they are not an end
solution to the core problem.
D. INCREASED EMPHASIS ON “WINNING” AND COLLECTING
MONETARY PENALTIES
The SEC’s current administrative court system is also problematic
purely as a policy matter because it places far too much significance on
simply winning cases and collecting monetary penalties for minimum
costs, rather than deterring future illegal action and protecting the public.
The problem is, winning and quick settlements often do little to deter
future illegal conduct when non-regulated entities see settlements as a
cost of doing business. To its credit, the Commission emphasized in 2013
that it would ask for accompanying admissions of guilt with settlement in
a broader range of cases.209 But contemporaneously, the Commission
also said that “the majority of cases will continue to be resolved on a no
admit no deny basis, as the interest in quick resolutions and settlements
will, in most cases, outweigh the interests in obtaining admissions.”210
And it appears that the overall effect of the policy change has been mini-
mal; the SEC has required and obtained admissions of guilt with settle-
ment only seven times since this policy change.211
E. OTHER EXTERNAL INDICATORS OF BIAS
Finally, in its reaction to complaints about its enforcement program,
the SEC is doing an increasingly poor job of portraying itself as an advo-
208. Id. at 2403 (citing Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958);
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
209. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Council of
Institutional Investors Fall Conference in Chicago, IL: Deploying the Full Enforcement
Arsenal (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370539841202.
210. Andrew Ceresney, Co-Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Financial Reporting and Accounting Fraud (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://
www.sec.gov/ News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539845772#.VMwTKWjF9zM.
211. See Gene Cahill et al., Fallout from the SEC’s Move to Reverse ‘No Admit or Deny’
Policy, 46 S.R.L.R. 1075 (2014), available at http://www.ralaw.com/media-events.cfm?type=
article&id=543.
2015] Fight over Home Court 533
cate for the public’s interests. After speaking defensively about the use of
administrative proceedings in several speeches, the SEC spun its enforce-
ment division statistics in its breakdown of 2013 civil actions and adminis-
trative proceedings.212 It excluded follow-on and delinquent filing
proceedings to make its total proportion of administrative proceedings
look smaller in comparison to the proportion of civil proceedings.213 But
when the SEC said it filed a record number of enforcement actions in
2011, it inconsistently included follow-on and delinquent filings adminis-
trative proceedings in that number.214
This recent statistical slant goes hand-in-hand with the SEC’s Internet-
era habit of using press releases to sway public opinion in its favor. The
SEC’s website contains press releases updating the public on recently ini-
tiated enforcement actions or touting the Commission’s victories in ad-
ministrative or civil proceedings.215 But as one commentator has recently
noted, the SEC often fails to publicly acknowledge its court losses.216 This
approach does not promote agency transparency to the public, and it can
continue to harm the accused’s reputation for years because the initial
press release detailing the accusations often stays near the top of search
engine results. Perhaps even more concerning, the Commission’s pre-
hearing press releases can sometimes blur the line between informative
and actively persuasive.217 If the SEC wants to combat the perception
that bias mars its in-house proceedings, it could start by addressing the
way it conducts public relations.
V. A PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE SEC ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
The aforementioned constitutional challenges may provide remedies to
individual defendants, but the larger problems with the SEC’s administra-
tive structure would likely remain intact. The following subsections pro-
pose revisions to the SEC Rules of Practice and objective criteria for
bringing administrative proceedings.
212. Andrew Ceresney, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21,
2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297#.VMnn
AWjF9zM.
213. Id.
214. Gallu, supra note 86.
215. SEC Litigation Releases Index, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases.shtml (last updated Apr. 16, 2015).
216. See Russell G. Ryan, Mum’s the Word about SEC Defeats, WALL ST. J., June 3,
2013, at A15.
217. See Russell G. Ryan, Get the SEC Out of the PR Business, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30,
2014, 5:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-get-the-sec-out-of-the-pr-busi-
ness-1417386821 (noting some pre-hearing press releases used “colorful words and phrases
like ‘tricks,’ ‘calculated fraud,’ ‘reaping substantial profits,’ and ‘choosing profits over com-
pliance’” to describe respondents’ conduct).
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A. DEVELOP OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR BRINGING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The SEC Division of Enforcement released a four-page document,
crafted similarly to a press release, on May 8, 2015 that outlined some of
the factors it considers when it chooses a legal forum for its enforcement
actions.218 While it said that it uses “no rigid formula,” the Division of
Enforcement said it considers the following factors: (1) “[t]he availability
of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in each forum”;
(2) “[w]hether any charged party is a registered entity or an individual
associated with a registered entity”; (3) “[t]he cost-, resource-, and time-
effectiveness of litigation in each forum”; and (4) “[f]air, consistent, and
effective resolution of securities law issues and matters.”219 These four
factors are a good start and perhaps an impressive display of initiative by
the SEC given the demand for such guidelines. However, they are not
exhaustive—even the release admits that—and the Division of Enforce-
ment should consider other factors also relevant to the administrative
respondent.220
The Commission should additionally consider such factors as (1) the
investigation’s length; (2) whether the claim is negligence-based or fraud-
based; (3) whether expert testimony would be required to obtain a
favorable verdict; (4) the amount of witnesses involved and their availa-
bility (given the administrative courts’ limited subpoena power); (5) the
number of documents that the SEC expects it will review; and (6) the
remedies that the SEC seeks.221 Most of these criteria go to whether the
complexity of the case might be better suited for federal court adjudica-
tion. One SEC commissioner has publicly advocated for such a system,222
but at least two others have indicated that they would not be in favor of
adopting any particular guidelines.223
The SEC recently hired an ombudsman “who will act as a liaison in
resolving problems that retail investors may have with the Commission or
self-regulatory organizations.”224 It would be wise for the Commission to
218. Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum Selection in Contested Actions, S.E.C.




221. See Lieberman, supra note 145, at *5.
222. Michael S. Piwowar, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the
“SEC Speaks” Conference 2015: A Fair, Orderly, and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spchcmsp.html#.VPTLM_nF9zM (noting
that “[t]o avoid the perception that the Commission is taking its tougher cases to its in-
house judges, and to ensure that all are treated fairly and equally, the Commission should
set out and implement guidelines for determining which cases are brought in administra-
tive proceedings and which in federal courts”).
223. Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Official Calls for Guidelines on When Cases are Brought In-
House, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2015 3:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/20/us-sec-
trials-idUSKBN0LO23020150220.
224. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Tracey L. McNeil Named as SEC’s First
Ombudsman (Sept. 5, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail /
PressRelease/1370542869949.
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ensure that the ombudsman solicited comments about the agency’s ad-
ministrative proceeding criteria and its Rules of Practice. She could then
submit those comments to a revisions committee, which could either im-
plement changes or propose legislation.
B. REVISE THE SEC RULES OF PRACTICE
In order to solve these larger, systemic issues, the SEC’s Rules of Prac-
tice must be revised, somewhat reversing the effects of 1993 and 1995
Revisions to the SEC’s Rules of Practice.225 Those revisions went into
effect largely to make the Commission’s internal court system speedier
and more efficient.226 However, because these internal courts now exer-
cise the same general authority as federal courts in enforcement actions
against non-regulated entities, the Rules of Practice must contain protec-
tions much more similar to the ones that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure afford. Though some commentators consider it unlikely that the
SEC would voluntarily enact these revisions,227 even the SEC’s general
counsel recently said that it would be “reasonable” to consider revising
the Rules of Practice “to make sure the process is fair” and suggested that
the current rules might be out of date.228 Legislative action would be re-
quired in lieu of self-imposed changes. If these Rules of Practice changes
occur, the SEC may have to bring fewer administrative enforcement ac-
tions to compensate for an inevitable slowdown in case-by-case process-
ing time. But that slowdown is a necessary reflection of the wider range
of increasingly complex securities cases that the Commission wants to
bring in-house.
Generally, these revisions should help solve problems with the Rules of
Practice that this Article has already explored. The three-tiered decision
deadline system of 120, 200, or 300 days should be removed or should at
least reflect a minimum one-year period for the proceedings to take
place. Alternatively, the respondent should be able to motion for a deci-
sion deadline extension of 60 or 120 days, and the ALJ should have the
authority to grant that motion. The SEC should disclose a list of fact wit-
nesses within one month of initial service, and the ALJ should not have
discretion concerning whether to allow deposition of the Commission’s
fact witnesses. Further, respondents should receive summary reports
from SEC expert witnesses prior to trial, and they should have the ability
to depose those expert witnesses.229 Finally, these proceedings should use
the Federal Rules of Evidence, if not in all cases, at least in cases involv-
ing non-regulated entities.
225. Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33,163, 55 S.E.C. Docket 1001
(Nov. 5, 1993).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 44–54.
227. See Lieberman, supra note 145, at *5.
228. Joel M. Cohen, SEC Plans to Play Insider-Trading Cases on Home Court, NAT.
L.J. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202670286446/SEC-Plans-to-
Play-InsiderTrading-Cases-on-Home-Court-?slreturn=20150030091046.
229. See Lieberman, supra note 145, at *5 n.26 (citing RP 360, 17 C.F.R. § 201.235).
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Some proposed procedural changes could directly affect who decides
the respondents’ cases. As several experts have already suggested,230 the
SEC could remove a perception of in-house bias by following the lead of
about two dozen states, including New Jersey,231 and by using indepen-
dent ALJs who work from outside of the agency. Additionally, given how
damaging extended litigation can be to an innocent respondent, appeals
of ALJ decisions should advance immediately to Article III judges rather
than to the Commission.
VI. CONCLUSION
The SEC’s administrative enforcement system did not worsen over-
night; its priorities changed over a series of decades and several signifi-
cant pieces of legislation. Improvement will take time. However, the Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Appointments Clause attacks discussed,
while largely valid, only arose recently, and they are primarily a product
of the Commission’s increasingly improper use of its administrative pro-
ceedings. Such claims will continue for the foreseeable future unless at
least one of two things occur: (1) the Supreme Court decides the validity
of those claims; or (2) the SEC’s Rules of Practice and criteria are revised
to reflect the interests of these petitioners who believe they are being
treated unfairly. Those suggested revisions align completely with the
SEC’s mission to serve and protect the public, and they are the best long-
term solution for ensuring the stability of the Commission’s administra-
tive court system.
230. See Morgenson, supra note 7; see also Cohen, supra note 228.
231. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq.; see also N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 et seq.
